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ABSTRACT
Thispaper examines the bequest\gift behavior of altruistic parents who
do not know their children's sbilities and cannot observe theit children's
work effort. Parents are likely to respond to this information problem by
making larger bequests to higher earning children and by using their transfers
implicitly either to tax at the msrgin low earning children or to subsidize at
the margin high earning children. These implicit tax ratea may be quite
large, despite the fact that total transfers are small. The paper suggests
that labor supply studies should take into account potential implicit family
taxation as wall as official government taxation. In addition, the fact that
the family may play an implicit role in taxation means that there may be less
need for the government to play auch a role.
Laurence J. Kotlikoff Asaaf Razin
NEER Research Department
1350 Massachusetts Avenue IMU
Cambridge, NA02138 700 19th Street, NW.
Washington. DC 20431—3—
The assumption that parents know perfectly the abilities of their
children underlies most, if not all, of the theoretical research on
intergenerational transfers. This assumption has s strong implication, namely
that sltruistic psrenta will make transfers to their children that are
independent of their children's work efforts. As this paper demonstrates, if
altruistic parents do not know their children's abilities and cannot observe
their work effort, they will condition their transfers on the level of their
children's labor earnings. To keep their children from pretending (by working
and earning less) to be of low ability in order to garner a larger transfer,
parents are likely to sake larger transfers to high earning children and
smaller transfers to low earning children. Indeed, in addressing their
information problem, altruistic parents may produce more inequality in. the
final consumption of children than would arise if parents were not altruistic.
To help keep their children from freeloading, parents may alao make their
transfers, at the margin, a function of their children's labor earnings. As a
consequence children's marginal returns to labor supply can.differ, and
potentially greatly, from their observed after tax wages.
Thoae familiar with the optimal income tax literature (Mirrleea, 1971;
Sadka, 1976; Stiglita, 1987) may sense a parallel between a parent who
redistributea among children of unobserved ebilitiea and a government that
rediatributes among citizen of unobaerved abilities. Indeed, the two problems
are essentially isomorphic. An immediate implication of this proposition is
that if government and parental preferences about the distribution of welfare
coincide there may be no optimal income tax role for the government; i.e.
parental choice of average and marginal transfers may substitute perfectly for
the government's optimal tax structure.-4-
The next section. II. contsins a simple model that illustrates the nature
of the parent's information problem. The model is used to show how the
parent's total and marginal transfers depend on the child's observed aarnings
Section III calculates for a specific utility function and a specified list of
parameters the values of transfers, the implicit marginal tax associated with
transfers, and other endogenous variables. Section IV discuases the model's
implications concerning debt neutrality pointing out that, as in Feldstein
(1988), Ricardian Equivalence will not hold in states of nature in which
transfers are operative provided that in other states of nature transfers are
inoperative. States of nature refer here to the realized abilities of
children. Section IV also concludes the paper with suggestions for additional
research.
II. The Choice of Transfers under Asymmetric Information
A static model suffices to clarify the problem of an altruistic parent
who wishes to transfer to a child, but does not know the child's ability and
can not observe the child's effort: The parent must infer from his (her)
observation of the child's earnings the ability and effort of the child. The
parent's utility depends on the parent's ownconsumptionand the utility of
the child. The utility of the child, in turn, is a concave function of the
child's ownconsumptionand the child's effort. Prior to observing the
child's labor earnings, the parent announces a set of transfers to the child
conditional on the child's labor earnings Hence, the parent maximizes his
(her) expected utility over the different possible states corresponding to
different levels of the child's ahility. The constraints in this maximization—5—
problem include the parent and child's combined budget constraint, self
selection constraints, and nonnegativity constraints on transfers from parents
to children. The self selection constraints ensure that the child will
truthfully reveal hia (her) ability,
With the exception of the nonnegativity constraints on transfers, the
problem is isomorphic to that of a government maximizing a weighted average of
its own utility from consumption and the utility of low and high ability
workers in the case that ability is unobservable. In place of an optimal
income tax, the parent uses his (her) trensfer to the child both to
redistribute end to provide the proper marginal incentives necessary for
truthful revelation.
To illustrate the problem in the siaplest manner let the child have two
possible ability levels, A1 and Ah, where A1 tAh.Earnings of the low and
high ability children are denoted by E1 and Eh. respectively. The
relationships between earnings, ability, and effort of the low and high




In equation (1) the wage per unit of effective labor supply is normalized to
The expected utility function of the parent is given by
(2) W q[U(C1) +$V(Ckl,El/Al)]
+(l—q)[U(C)+—6—
where q is the probability the child is of low ability, C,1 and Cph are the
consumption values of the parent if the child turns out to have low or high
ability respectively, and V( ,) isthe utility function of the child which
depends on his (her) conaumption (Ckl for the low ability child and Ckh for
the high ability child) and his or her effort L1 or Lb. In (2) these effort
levels are replaced (using (1)) by earnings divided by ability.
The parent's problem is to maximiss (2) with respect to Ckl. Cph
Ckh. l' and h subject to the budget constraints given in (3) and (4), the
self selection constrsints given in (5) and (6), and the nonnegativity
constraints on transfers given in (7) and (8). In the budget constraints Y
stands for the parents income. Note that Y — isthe parent's transfer to
the low ability child, and Y —
Cph
is the parent's transfer to the high
ability child.
(3) 1' +E1C1 +Ckl
(4) Y+Eh￿Ch+Ckh
(5) V(Ckh.E*n/An) V(C1, E1/A.0)
(6) V(Ckl. E1/A1) ￿V(Ckh,h"1
(7) Y￿C1
(8)YCh
Let us associate the Lagrsngian multipliers l and with the
constraints (3) and (4), respectively, the multipliers A1 and Ah with the
constraints (5) and (6), respectively, and the multipliers p and h with the
constraints (7) and (8), respectively. Equations (9)—(14) present the first—7—
order conditions for the choices of Cr1, Cph. Ckl. C, E1, and under the
assumptions that (5) is binding, that (6) is not binding, and that transfers
are nonnegative, i.e. ,thatp1 and TMh are 0.
(9) qU(C1) — — 0












(14) (]._)flV2(Ckh.Eh/Ah) +0h÷ Ah21ththt)Ah
The combinations of (9) and (11) and (10) and (12) indicate that the
parent equates his (her) marginal utility of consumption to times the
child's marginal utility of consumption plus a term that indicates how
increasing the child's consumption through an increase in transfers (since
transfers equal Y minus parent's consumption) affects the self selection
constraint (5). In the case of equation (11) transferring another dollar to
the child (increasing the child's consumption by a dollar) raises the high
ability child's utility when he pretends to be of low ability; this makes the
self selection more difficult to satisfy and therefore raises, at the margin,
the cost of transferring to the child. The opposite occurs with respect to
equation (12).
The addition of equations (12) and (14) indicate that the high ability
child's marginal rate of substitution —(V2/V1) between consumption and effort—8—
is equated to his(her)marginal productivity (Ah) -Thisis not the case for
the low ability child. The addition of (11.) and (13) indicates that the low





(16) H —V1(C1Ekl/A.fl) —V1(C1Ekl/Al) +
V2(CklEl/A.h)_
—V2(Ckl,El/Al)3-
If V12 ￿0,i.e. ,themarginal utility of consumption decreases with the
amount of effort (increases with the amount of leisure), qfl —)th (from
equation (LI)) and H (from equation (16)) are positive. Hence, the tax rate
on the high ability child is positive since 1h is positive.
If the self selection constraint on the low ability child's utility
(equation (6)) is binding, a similar argument indicates that the low ability
child will face a zero implicit marginal tax, while the high ability child
will face an implicit marginal subsidy.
In the case of full information there are no self selection constraints,
so the solution can be found by simply setting Ah or A1 equal to zero in the
first order conditions for the choice of Cr1, Cph 0k1' kh' E1, and Eh. In
this case there is, of course, no distortion of the child's work effort, and
the parent equates his (her) marginsl utility of consumption to $ times the
child's marginal utility of consumption.
Figure 1 depicts the case in which the self selection constraint on the
high ability child is binding. The diagram, which is, except for symbols,
identical to that in Sadka (1976), plots the utility of the child in[,Lk kh






consumption and earnings space assuming V12 s0.At any paint in this space
the slope of the high ability child's indifference curve i smaller than that
of the low ability child. At the optimum the high ability child is at point A
andfaces no implicit marginal tax (i.e. the slope of his (her) indifference
curve is I). At point A the high ability child is Indifferent between
truthfully revealing his (her) ability and pretending to he of low ability by
earning E1 and consuming Ckl at point B. The low ability child ends up at
point B with the slope of his (her) indifference curve less than 1, indicating
a positive implicit tax.1
UI. Comparisons of the Asymmetric end Perfect Information Solutions
The log—linear utility function given in equation (17) is useful for
illuatrating differences between the full information and asymmetric
informationproblems -
(17) W —q[logC1 fl(logC1— a(E1JA)] +(l—q)(logC+$(logCkh—aE.fl/A.hfl]
It is easy to show for this function that the two self selection constraints
cannot simulataneously bebinding. From the first order conditions it is
easyto confirm the following relationships, where the superscript f stands







Inwords, in the asyassetric information case the parent of the high
ability child consumes less and makes a larger tranafer (since transfers equal
Y —
Cph)
Pwhilethe parent of the low ability child consumes more and makes a
smaller transfer. Hence, transfers are less equalizing for this utility
function when information is asymmetric, and as presently described, under
asymmetric information the transfer to the high ability child csn exceed that
to the low sbility child, while the reverse holds under full information. The
equations in (18) also indicate that the high ability child consumes the same,
but earns less in the asymmetric information case with increased transfers
making up for the lower earnings. The low ability child consumes less in the
asymmetric case, but his (her) earnings may be larger or smaller.
Table 1 comparea the asymmetric and full information solutions for this
utility function for a range of parameter values. The results are quite
striking. For each of the sets of parameters asymmetric information leads
parents to transfer more to the high ability child than to the low ability
child, i.e., transfers are not equalizing. For example, for the benchmark—11—
parameters the transfers, under full information, are 1.42 to the low ability
child and .9 to the high ability child. With incomplete information, however,
the transfers are almost the reverse, with only 1.04 going to the Low ability
child and 1.34 going to the high ability child. The counterpart of these
differences in transfers is that the conaumption of parents will be quite
different when information is asymmetric than when it is not. For the
benchmark parameters parents of high ability children consume 2.10 under full
information but only 1.66 under asymmetric information, while parents of Low
ability children consume 1.58 under full information but 1.96 under asymmetric
information.
The consumption of low ability children in the benchmark case is 1.50
with full information, but only 1.36 with asymmetric information; for high
ability children, earnings adjust to maintain the same consumption level under
full and asymmetric information. Hence, compared with the case of full
informstion, the consumption of high and low ability children is less equal
when information is asymmetric. Indeed, when information is asymmetric the
process of parents transferring to their children can lead to more inequality
in their children's consumption than would occur if parents were not
altruistic and made no transfers to their children. For the benchmark
parameters, but with —0,the high ability child's consumption is 2.00,
while the low ability child's consumption is 1.50 (as in the full information
case with —.95),
The implicit marginal tax rates on the low ability child listed in Table
1 range from 7 percent to 28 percent. The 28 percent figure is particularly
interesting. This implicit tax rate arises when Ah equals 1.25 while A1—12—
remains at 75. Compared with the benchmark case the implicit marginal tax
rate is over three times larger, although the total transfer to the low
ability child is almost 25 percent smaller. This comparison indicates that
implicit marginal taxation through parental bequests and intervivos transfers
can be quite large despite the fact that total transfers are small.
The different parameter combinations considered in the second two columns
of Table 1 suggest that children's labor earnings can be quite sensitive to
the extent of altruism (the level of fi).Columns5 and 6 of this Table
consider a lower value of the probability q of having a low ability child. In
the case of asymmetric information the smaller value of q leads to smaller
transfers to both the high and low ability children, but to a higher implicit
tax on the low ability child.
Section IV Implications for Debt Neutrelity end Conclusions
Any new model of intergenerational transfers should be immediately
examined with respect to Robert garro's (1974) debt neutrality proposition
(Ricardian Equivalence). As in Feldatein (1988) the model presented here will
not exhibit Ricerdian Equivalence in states of nature when altruistic
transfers are operative unless transfers are operative in all states of
nature. To see this suppose that the solution to the parent's problem
involves zero transfers to the high ability child, but positive transfers to
the low ability child. The self selection constraint (5) in this case may
still be binding, because the high ability child may try to disguiee himself
(herself) as a low ability child to receive a transfer. If the government
redistributes from the parent to the child independent of the child's earnings—13—
(in a lump sum fashion) the utility of the high ability child will increase.
Eut this will alter the self selection constraint (5) and, thereby, alter the
outcome when the child is of low ability. In particular, by increasing the
left bend side of (5) the government policy relaxes this self selection
constraint evaluated at the pre—government transfer optimum. As a consequence
the total (government plus parent) transfers to the low ability child will
likely be greater as a result of the government's policy. Hence, the policy
will likely be effective in redistributing to the child regardless of whether
the child turns out to be of high or low ability.
to summarize this paper's findings, the inability of parents to know or
to monitor perfectly their children's work efforts can significantly alter
parental transfers to children. Parents are likely to respond to their
information problem by making larger bequests to higher earning children and
by using their transfers implicitly either to tax at the margin low earning
children or to subsidize at the margin high earning children. These implicit
tax rates may be quite large, despite the fact that total transfers are small.
Hence, labor supply studies should take into account potential implicit family
taxation as well as official government taxation. In addition, the fact that
the family may play an implicit role in taxation means that there may be less
need for the government to play such a role.—14—
Notes
1. To be more precise, the slope (the right derivative) of the budget
constraint relating the child's pre—perent transfer earnings to his (her)
post—parent transfer consumption at point 3 must be less unity. Indeed, this
slope must be less then or equal to the elope of the high ability child's
indifference curve at point B; ie, the "marginal tax schedule must have a
kink at point B.—15-—
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Table 1
Calculations Based on the Log—Linear Utility Function













1.66 2.10 2.15 2.67 1.87 2.10 2.09 2.63 1.75 2.63
Ckl 1.36 1.50 1.39 1.50 1.30 1.50 1.72 2.24 1.07 1.50
Ckh 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
E1 .34 .08 .83 .50 .50 .08 1.18 .85 .33 .08
Eh .67 1.11 1.15 1.67 .87 1.11 1.58 2.13 1.25 2.13
T1 1.04 1.42 .57 1.00 .80 1.42 .54 1.03 .74 1.42
Th 1.34 .09 .85 .33 1.13 .90 .91 .37 1.25 .37
.09 .00 .07 .00 .13 .00 .08 .00 .28 .00
Except where indicated all parameters are the benchmark parameters. The
benchmark parameters are?— 3, A1 —.75.A— 1, q —.5,fi— .95,a—
r stands for the implicit marginal tax on the low ability child, It is
defined by Wi —A1.(1—r1)for i—1,h, where MRS is the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and effort.